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ABSTRACT 
 
Hacking AngelList: Third Party Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding 
 
BY 
 
Matthew C. Klein 
 
April 14, 2016 
 
 
Committee Chair: Wesley J. Johnston 
 
Major Academic Unit: J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
 
 
This dissertation examines the effectiveness of third party affiliation signals that 
entrepreneurs use to convince investors to commit financial resources in an equity crowdfunding 
context.  I investigate the importance of third party affiliation signals (business accelerators, 
investor syndicates, and startups featured on the equity crowdfunding platform) on subsequent 
online funding amounts.  The data indicates that affiliation with an investor syndicate is an 
effective third party affiliation signal and can therefore strongly impact the probability of online 
funding amounts.  Business accelerators and startups featured on the equity crowdfunding 
platform, by contrast, have little or no impact on online funding amounts.  I discuss the 
implications of the results for theory, future research, and practice. 
 
 
Keywords: equity crowdfunding, signaling theory, third party affiliation, business accelerator, 
investor syndicate, crowdfunding intermediary, entrepreneur, startup
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
The Jumpstart our Business Startups (JOBS) Act was signed by President Obama 
legalizing equity crowdfunding.  During the Rose Garden ceremony, Obama stated that “for 
startups and small businesses, this bill is a potential game changer” (Obama, 2012).  Regardless 
of the enthusiasm from policy makers, regulators, investors, and entrepreneurs, it is unclear how 
equity crowdfunding might change the way startups seek financing (Mollick, 2014).  Equity 
crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to sell equity or debt financing in a company on the Internet 
(Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2015).  This open call and investment occurs via 
online platforms (e.g., AngelList) that enable startups seeking angel financing and accredited 
investors to meet and communicate.  
According to Plummer, Allison, and Connelly (2015), third party affiliation signals 
enhance a startups characteristics and actions.  In order to achieve funding success on equity 
crowdfunding platforms, startup characteristics and actions must be combined with third party 
affiliations to enhance the overall signal in order to capture the attention of investors.  Some 
startups, such as Beepi, a site for buying and selling cars, have been successful utilizing third 
party affiliation signals.  In December 2014, Beepi raised a $72.7 million Series B investment led 
by Foundation Capital and Sherpa Ventures valuing the company at $200 million just five 
months after it launched and the investment included $2.8 million from Gil Penhina’s online 
investor syndicate from AngelList (Del Ray, 2014).  The subsequent investment in Beepi 
represents one of the largest equity crowdfunding investments on AngelList since the platform 
was founded in 2010 (Foster, 2014).  Thus, the success of Beepi helps explain the research 
question: what third party affiliation signals, in the context of equity crowdfunding, impact 
online funding amounts? 
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The purpose of this research is to investigate in an equity crowdfunding context the 
effectiveness of third party affiliation signals that startups use to convince investors to commit 
financial resources.  I analyze 320 equity crowdfunding investments between June 2013 and 
January 2016 from data obtained from AngelList, the third largest equity crowdfunding platform 
in the world (Massolution, 2015).  The AngelList platform is suitable for this type of research 
because of its global presence and it being based in the United States, a country that permits 
equity crowdfunding as of October 30, 2015 when the final rules for companies to offer and sell 
securities was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2015). 
Prior academic research demonstrates that investors evaluate signals sent by startups to 
assess quality (Connelly, Certo, Ireland & Reutzel, 2011).  Utilizing signaling theory (Spence, 
1973), this dissertation will attempt to describe how startups align themselves with third party 
affiliations to strengthen the signals associated with their actions and characteristics in order to 
positively impact online funding amounts. The literature has historically focused on signaling 
within the context of initial public offerings (Certo, Holcomb, & Holmes, 2009).  However, no 
prior research has examined third party affiliation signaling in an equity crowdfunding 
environment.  
 The way startups signal in equity crowdfunding is distinct from the way companies signal 
when pursuing initial public offerings.  The decision to invest in a startup via equity 
crowdfunding has higher levels of information asymmetry than companies pursuing initial public 
offerings.  When higher levels of information asymmetry are present, third party affiliation 
signaling significantly strengthens other startup characteristics and actions in order to reduce the 
noise of the signaling environment.  Thus, investors may experience less information asymmetry 
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regarding the signaling of startup actions and characteristics when a third party affiliation that 
has a strong reputation endorses them. 
 To this end, I provide evidence for the importance of third party affiliation signals in the 
context of equity crowdfunding.  I analyze the impact of third party affiliation signals (business 
accelerators, investor syndicates, and startups featured on the equity crowdfunding platform) on 
subsequent online funding amounts.  The data indicates that affiliation with an investor syndicate 
is an effective third party affiliation signal and can therefore strongly impact the probability of 
online funding amounts.  Business accelerators and startups featured on the equity crowdfunding 
platform, by contrast, have little or no impact on online funding amounts.  
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In this section, I describe the various startup financing sources and introduce the concept 
of crowdfunding as a new form of financing for startups.  Next, I give an outline and describe the 
differences between various forms of startup finance and the different models of crowdfunding. 
Thereafter, I provide an overview of the equity crowdfunding market.  
II.1 Startup Financing 
 Previous research has recognized that entrepreneurs face difficulties in selecting the right 
financing source (Cassar, 2004).  If an entrepreneur has an innovative idea or a large market 
potential, the decision associated with financing is paramount in order to maintain the growth 
projections of the firm.  According to Cassar (2004), entrepreneurs have problems associated 
with information asymmetry, agency costs and transaction costs when raising financing in 
comparison to established companies.  
 The financial growth cycle paradigm (Berger & Udell, 1998) examined how financing 
sources varied with firm size and age.  The research described a linear relationship with 
entrepreneurs as the first source of financing followed by angel investors, venture capitalists and 
subsequent initial public offerings.  This linear relationship was also described by Cardullo 
(1999) in relation to technology based startups that follow a similar financing life cycle based on 
revenue and time.  
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Figure 1: Stages of Entrepreneurial Firm Development 
Source: Cardullo (1999). 
While previous empirical research has examined each source of financing as separate 
transactions, the approach is being challenged as many entrepreneurs are no longer following the 
linear path described by Berger and Udell (1998) and Cardullo (1999).  Entrepreneurs are now 
combining several forms of financing and this represents a new paradigm shift.  
 The primary reason for the shift in financing decisions by entrepreneurs is that startups 
are becoming cheaper to start (Graham, 2013).  Entrepreneurs can now use various social 
networks (e.g. Twitter and LinkedIn) to publicly advertise their financial offerings as of October 
30, 2015 when the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted final rules for companies to 
offer and sell securities (SEC, 2015).  The Internet has effectively removed barriers for 
entrepreneurs in terms of finding customers and potential investors.  Since startups need less 
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financing, entrepreneurs are creating new challenges for traditional investors, especially for 
venture capitalists, who traditionally invest in the equity offerings issued by startups.  Because 
entrepreneurs have the upper hand, they will retain larger shares of the stock and control of their 
startup companies (Graham, 2013).  
 This shift toward the Internet for many entrepreneurs has led to the growing popularity of 
crowdfunding.  Traditional investors (e.g. angel investors and venture capitalists) view the 
emergence of crowdfunding as a potential threat because entrepreneurs can now obtain startup 
financing from the crowd.  With no geographical barriers and limited costs, entrepreneurs are 
transitioning to social networks and dedicated crowdfunding platforms.  The recent trend toward 
crowdfunding is a shift in the financing decisions for entrepreneurs.  A review of the different 
sources of startup financing is outlined below.  
Table 1: Sources of Startup Financing 
Small amounts Debt Equity 
 Governmental organizations Governmental organizations  
 Bank loans  
 Bootstrapping Bootstrapping 
 Friends and family Friends and family 
 Leasing  
 Crowdfunding Crowdfunding 
  Angel investors 
  Venture capitalists 
Large amounts  Stock markets 
 
The table divides startup financing by either debt or equity and the amount of capital 
invested.  I will discuss several of these forms of financing but from a broader perspective I want 
to address how startups attain financing at the time of creation (Cassar, 2004).  As stated 
previously, Berger and Udell (1998) conclude that startup financing changes over time and this 
change is dependent upon the size, age and degree of information asymmetry.  The financial 
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growth cycle paradigm describes this phenomenon as startups are financially constrained due to 
limited access to external financing (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). 
 In 2004, the Kaufmann Foundation collected survey data on the financing decisions of 
startup companies.  The data was not limited to technology based startups, but rather was a 
representative sample of startups throughout the United States.  According to Robb and 
Robinson (2012), firms relied heavily on debt financing at the time of creation.  In particular, 
external financing provided by the entrepreneur was the most prevalent followed by other debt 
sources such as bank loans or friends and family.  In a similar study, Cole and Sokolyk (2013) 
observe that 25 percent of startups are entirely financed by equity and the use of personal 
financing by the entrepreneur decreases over time as the startup achieves growth. 
 A common misconception is that venture capital is the main driver of startup financing. 
According to Gompers and Lerner (2001), the requirement to exit (acquisition or initial public 
offering) is the main driver for venture capitalists.  There are 28.2 million businesses in the 
United States (SBA, 2014).  Because of the return on investment requirements, venture 
capitalists are only interested in businesses with significant growth projections.  The goal is for 
these startups to become a large publicly traded companies within five to seven years.  This 
criterion limits the venture capital firms to a small available market of businesses each year as 
the majority will never attain the necessary growth projections.  For most businesses outside of 
the tech industry, many of them will never be considered a candidate for venture capital 
financing. 
 What this indicates is the importance of preliminary financing steps that startups utilize 
before venture capital firms are approached.  The research by Cassar (2004) and Robb and 
Robinson (2012) support the dependency of startups in regards to external financing 
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requirements.  At the time of creation, half of the external financing is derived from loans, 
mainly from the startup founders themselves (Robb & Robinson, 2012).  This use of loans (debt) 
allows startups founders to retain larger shares of the stock (equity) until significantly larger 
investments by venture capitalists are required to attain growth projections. 
 The American government often provides financing for startups despite asymmetric 
information and the controversies that ensue when governmental organizations emulate the 
financing decisions of the private sector (Cressy, 2002).  According to Minniti and Lévesque 
(2008), governmental organizations believe that startups play a significant role in economic 
growth and therefore governmental organizations create a number of programs to encourage 
entrepreneurial activity.  One such activity is providing tax credits for investment in startups 
(Tuomi & Boxer, 2015).  According to Armour and Cumming (2006), government programs 
more often hurt than help the development of venture capital and other sources of startup 
financing.  In contrast, Brander, Du, and Hellmann (2014) argue that markets with government 
sponsored venture capital have higher levels of total venture capital financing.  The results 
indicate that government sponsored financing largely complements other forms of private 
financing but more research is needed to study the effectiveness of government financing 
programs.  
 A more recent phenomenon is bootstrapping whereby startup entrepreneurs use their own 
savings, personal credit cards and other financial resources.  The goal is for entrepreneurs to 
reach as many growth milestones as possible before opening the startup to outside investors. 
According to Ebben and Johnson (2006), bootstrapping refers to methods that entrepreneurs use 
to limit outside financing, improve cash flow and maximize personal sources of finance. 
Examples of entrepreneurial bootstrapping activities provided by Winborg and Landström (2001) 
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include: using credit cards, obtaining loans from friends and family, withholding salaries or 
working for below-market salaries, engaging in freelance opportunities, borrowing equipment, 
delaying supplier payments and other frugal measures by the entrepreneur to limit the need for 
outside financing. 
 The use of bootstrap financing by startups is a requirement if no other alternative source 
of financing is available (Auken, 2005).  As the research by Ebben and Johnson (2006) 
concluded, entrepreneurs who are limited in financing options view bootstrapping as the only 
way to survive.  In contrast, Vanacker, Maingart, Meuleman, and Sels (2011) view bootstrapping 
as a choice or the philosophical mindset of the entrepreneur. 
 The most likely alternative to bootstrapping is engaging angel investors for early rounds 
of financing (Prowse, 1998; Wong, 2002).  Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide 
financing for startups.  According to Shane (2012), angel investment accounts for less than 1% 
of startup financing.  However, the importance of angel investors can not be underestimated as 
they provide financing for startups at the early stage of development.   
 Angel investors can also be members of a network of angels such as Tech Coast Angels 
that review entrepreneurs seeking financing (Payne & Macarty, 2002).  According to the Angel 
Capital Association in 2013, angels invested $25 billion in 71,000 companies.  On average angel 
investors provide $191,000 (and a median of $50,000) in funding to startups (Wiltbank & 
Boeker, 2007).  In a study conducted by Harvard and MIT, angel investor support was correlated 
with improvements in startup success rates (Linde, Prasa, Morse, Utterback & Stevenson, 2000). 
 In contrast, venture capitalists have the ability to finance larger amounts of capital across 
several rounds of financing for startups.  Venture capitalists operate as fund managers and seek 
investment from individuals and institutions in order to provide financing to startups that offer 
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high risk and high rewards (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Sahlman, 1990).  A detailed literature 
review on venture capital was published by Da Rin, Hellmann and Puri (2011).  
 Similar to angel investors, venture capitalists are equity investors who work with the 
management teams of startups in various capacities.  In many cases, venture capitalists support 
professionalization measures such as assistance with recruiting talented employees, corporate 
governance, hiring decisions, and replacing poor performing management teams (Hellman & 
Puri, 2002).  The evidence suggests that the behavior of venture capitalists is beyond those of 
traditional financial intermediaries because their contracting behavior enables them to overcome 
problems associated with information asymmetry (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2000).  Previous 
research has extensively documented how venture capitalists add value to the companies in their 
investment portfolios (Gompers, Kovner & Lerner, 2009; Sapienza, Manigart & Vermeir, 1996). 
However, the availability of exit opportunities is important to both angel investors and venture 
capitalists (Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007; Schwienbacher, 2008).  Historically speaking, the most 
common practice of exit is through initial public offerings for venture capitalists (Black & 
Gilson, 1998). 
As stated previously, entrepreneurs do not follow a predetermined path of financing that 
starts with friends and family, angel investors and then venture capital.  Instead entrepreneurs 
may trade off different forms or even combine several forms simultaneously.  Typically, startup 
financing research is based on specific databases (such as CapitalIQ, CrunchBase and 
MatterMark) and not directly from the companies with the exception of the Kaufmann Firm 
Surveys, which sends questionnaires to startup companies (Cole & Sokolyk, 2013; Robb & 
Robinson, 2012). 
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 The entrepreneurial finance literature considers the choice of financing in terms of the 
pecking order theory.  The theory states that with an increase in asymmetric information, the cost 
financing increases (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  The financing is in the form of internal funds 
(bootstrapping) and the issuance of new debt and equity.  From a preference standpoint, startups 
prefer internal funds (bootstrapping), issuing new debt and issuing equity as a last resort.  
 Stewart Myers popularized the pecking order theory by arguing that asymmetric 
information affects the choice between issuing debt and equity.  By raising debt, entrepreneurs 
signal to investors confidence in the startup and the ability to repay, whereas selling equity 
signals a lack of confidence (although this does not apply to high-tech industries with its 
typically intangible assets).  The theory assumes that startups adhere to a hierarchy of financing 
options and prefer internal financing (bootstrapping) as the first option, the raising of debt as the 
second option and the selling of equity as the third option.  Entrepreneurs must consider these 
startup capital structure decisions as they represent a signal to outside investors about the 
potential success of the startup (Ross, 1977). 
Previous peer-reviewed academic research has found that startups do combine several 
forms of financing such as angel investors and venture capitalists (Cosh, Cumming & Hughes, 
2009; Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch & Triantis, 2009).  According to Goldfarb (2009), angel 
investors often partner alongside venture capital firms to co-invest in the same round via 
syndication.  In many cases, the combination of two types of co-investors serve as a 
complimentary role to the startup (Wong, 2002).  According to Robb and Robinson (2012), 
several traditional forms such as bank financing, angel investors, and friends and family are 
combined at startup formation.  
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Previous research has investigated the motivations of entrepreneurs in terms of selecting 
one form over the other or combining several forms of financing together.  In addition, previous 
research also has examined the choice between angel investors and venture capitalists. 
According to Elitzur and Gavious (2003), the difference is angel investors are constrained in the 
amount of investment they can provide.  However, with the rise of super angels (Sudek & 
Wiltbank, 2011) this distinction is no longer applicable.  
In many cases, the contractual arrangements (liquidation preferences, voting provisions, 
anti-dilution and information rights) with angel investors may complicate later-round contractual 
arrangements with venture capitalists.  Chemmanur and Chen (2003) assume that angel investors 
are passive investors who only provide money while venture capitalists are actively involved 
with the investment.  Depending on the round of financing (Seed, Series A, Series B, etc.) 
entrepreneurs may switch investor types and Schwienbacher (2013) observes that investors may 
differ in their degree of focus and specialization.  By comparing the round of financing with the 
type of investor (specialists versus generalists) entrepreneurs must take into account the potential 
tradeoff.  Specialists who invest only in one stage of development may improve the chances of 
securing follow-up financing from other investors, whereas generalists secure funding along the 
different stages of development.  In situations of information asymmetry, entrepreneurs may 
signal quality by choosing specialists to help guide them to the next round of financing.  
II.2 Crowdfunding 
 Crowdfunding is a type of fundraising, conducted via the Internet, in which a large 
number of people pool relatively small individual investments in order to fund a specific purpose 
(Ahlers et al., 2015).  The literature on the topic is relatively new and this explains a number of 
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nuances in how crowdfunding is defined as academic research emerges to develop consensus. 
The definition by Schwienbacher and Larralde (2010), explicitly defines crowdfunding as  
“the financing of a project or a venture by a group of individuals instead of professional parties”. 
This definition emphasizes that there is no intermediary as entrepreneurs are raising money 
directly from the crowd.  In theory, the majority of individuals already invest albeit indirectly 
through their savings which typically is managed by intermediary institutions such as banks, so 
crowdfunding implies a more direct interaction between investors and entrepreneurs.  
 Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2014) elaborated on the definition of a more 
general concept of crowdsourcing provided by Kleemann, Voß and Rieder (2008) in order to 
define crowdfunding as “an open call, mostly through the Internet, for the provision of financial 
resources either in the form of donation or in exchange for the future product or some form of 
reward to support initiatives for specific purposes”.  Mollick (2014) and Bradford (2012), 
acknowledge that crowdfunding essentially draws inspiration from microfinance (Morduch, 
1999) and crowdsourcing (Howe, 2006), but still represents a unique category of financing 
enabled by the rapid expansion of Internet platforms serving as crowdfunding intermediaries. 
According to Mollick (2014), the “popular and academic conceptions of crowdfunding are in a 
state of evolutionary flux” by highlighting the definition from Belleflamme et al. (2014) does not 
include alternative forms of crowdfunding such as peer-to-peer lending.  In response, Mollick 
(2014) provides for a narrower definition in an entrepreneurial context: “crowdfunding refers to 
the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups – cultural, social, and for-profit – to fund 
their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of 
individuals using the Internet, without standard financial intermediaries.” 
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 The three primary reasons for selecting crowdfunding were identified by Belleflamme, 
Lambert and Schwienbacher (2013) from interviews with entrepreneurs.  The main reason given 
by all the respondents using crowdfunding was collecting funds.  In addition, attracting the 
attention of the public and obtaining feedback on products and services were also motives for the 
entrepreneurs using crowdfunding.  Gerber, Hui and Kuo (2012) conducted a similar study 
identifying five types of incentives: receiving investment, building connections, self-affirmation, 
product exposure, and the subsequent success story.  Thus, crowdfunding is uniquely positioned 
to provide entrepreneurs in the early stages with an alternative financing option (Hemer, 2011). 
More importantly, market participants (namely investors) view a successful crowdfunding 
campaign as a positive signal about the future of a startup.   
 The recent changes in the crowdfunding legal environment gives consumers the ability to 
become investors (Ordanini, Miceli, Pizzetti & Parasuraman, 2011).  Consumers investing in 
crowdfunding projects believe in the startup and are willing to prepay for products or services. 
Using crowdfunding in this manner, the startup is able to build a customer base quickly and send 
a positive signal to the market.  According to Burtch, Ghose and Wattal, (2013) crowdfunding 
increases product consumption and visibility.  Crowdfunding also allows for easier access to 
potential customers, the opportunity for press coverage for successful campaigns, and interest 
from potential outside investors and employees (Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014).  
 Similar to bootstrapping, crowdfunding allows startups to test their product-market fit 
with potential customers.  Most startups fail due to their inability to identify potential customers 
(Blank, 2013).  In a theoretical model, Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010) 
illustrate how pre-ordering via reward-based crowdfunding facilitates price discrimination.  This 
method of bootstrapping allows startups to identify potential customers with a high willingness 
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to pay.  In a subsequent paper, Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2013) develop a 
theoretical model for startups to help them decide between the profit-sharing or pre-ordering 
model of crowdfunding.  
 Previous academic research has examined the investment decision and subsequent 
participation of investors as well as their respective motivations.  The findings suggest that 
investors are more than just financially motivated.  Research conducted by Allison, Davis, Short 
and Webb (2014) and Lin, Boh and Goh (2014) demonstrate that intrinsic and extrinsic motives 
and social reputation were apparent signals from investors.  The findings also illustrate that the 
motivation to participate in crowdfunding is dependent upon the business model (Lin et al., 
2014; Ordanini et al., 2011).  In a previous study employing a grounded theory approach the 
findings demonstrate that investors have similar attributes to one another.  These attributes 
include: an innovation orientation, a desire for interaction with entrepreneurs, personal 
identification with the startup product or service, and a keen interest in the success or financial 
results (Ordanini et al., 2011).  Subsequent interviews of entrepreneurs and investors also 
confirmed these same motivations and the importance of social networks (Gerber et al., 2012).  
 Investors prefer the interaction that social networks provide to help breakthrough the 
noise of the signaling environment on crowdfunding platforms.  Previous peer-reviewed research 
has investigated the impact of social networks on investment decisions.  The subsequent results 
indicate a correlation between the reduction of information asymmetries via social networks and 
the increase in funding (Lin, Prabhala & Viswanthan, 2013).  A consequence of social networks 
is the prevalence of herding behavior (Zhang & Liu, 2012).  As an example, Bryce Roberts, the 
cofounder of O’Reilly AlphaTech Ventures wrote a blog post about why he deleted his 
AngelList account.  In the post, Roberts describes AngelList as being in the business of 
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generating “heat” for startups by allocating a substantial amount of importance to what 
AngelList describes as “social proof” (Roberts, 2011).  Sharing the same conclusions, Robert 
Scoble, a futurist at Rackspace, described the AngelList platform as a place where “investors 
tend to be pack animals and tend to want to get in on hot deals and AngelList makes the hot deals 
happen fast” (Scoble, 2011). 
 Entrepreneurs and investors benefit by having the crowdfunding platform serve the role 
of an intermediary in transactions (Haas & Leimeister, 2014).  The crowdfunding platform helps 
reduce information asymmetries and also operates to facilitate information, communication, and 
investment (Allen & Santomero, 1997; Brealey, Leland & Pyle, 1977).  Different types of 
investment models exist for each of the crowdfunding platforms.  One of the most common is the 
all-or-nothing approach where the entrepreneur only receives the investment if they achieve a 
pre-defined threshold for the project.  Whereas entrepreneurs receive all the investment in the 
keep-what-you-get model.  These different investment models help reinforce the increasing 
specialization of crowdfunding platforms as the intermediaries focus on particular market 
segments and niches.  Thus, intermediaries serve innovative and creative projects (Argawal et 
al., 2011), startups and entrepreneurs (Ahlers et al., 2015) or nonprofit projects (Burtch et al., 
2013).  
 Legal scholars have discussed crowdfunding since 2009 in the United States.  According 
to Kappel (2009), the discussion surrounded the legality of crowdfunding intermediaries and the 
subsequent application of federal securities laws.  These legal issues along with the crash of the 
U.S. financial system in early 2008 prompted changes in legislation (Stemler, 2013).  A 
bipartisan legislative proposal was signed by President Obama on April 5, 2012 in order to 
increase access to startup funding and was supported by many in the technology and startup 
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communities including Steve Case (founder of AOL), Naval Ravikant (founder of AngelList), 
Ron Conway (founder of SV Angel) and Dave McClure (founder of 500 Startups).  The purpose 
of the “Jumpstart our Business Startups Act” (JOBS Act) was to make it easier and cheaper for 
startups to raise equity capital.  Signed on March 25, 2015, Title IV of the JOBS Act, called 
Regulation A+, allows startups to offer and sell securities to unaccredited investors.  Below is a 
table of key dates in legislation that worked toward finalizing the rules and requirements for 
entrepreneurs, investors and intermediaries. 
Table 2: Key Dates in Crowdfunding Legislation 
Date Description 
September 8, 2011 President Obama mentions crowdfunding in his jobs speech. 
November 3, 2011 The House passes H.R. 2930 in 407-17 bipartisan vote. 
March 22, 2012 The Senate passes the JOBS Act amended with the Crowdfund Act. 
March 27, 2012 The House passes the Crowdfund Act. 
April 5, 2012 President Obama signs the Crowdfund Act into law. 
September 23, 2013 SEC implements Title II of JOBS Act. 
March 25, 2015 SEC passes Title IV allowing non-accredited investors.  
October 30, 2015 SEC Adopts Final Rules to Permit Crowdfunding. 
May 16, 2016 SEC final rules and forms are effective. 
  
Using data from the Kickstarter platform, Mollick (2014) found that as the campaign 
duration and overall funding amount increases, the probability of success decreases on the 
platform for reward-based crowdfunding efforts.  In order to increase the likelihood of funding, 
entrepreneur’s need to have a large social network, a product video and be geographically 
located near sources of capital.  In a similar study, Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) confirm 
that entrepreneurs with large social networks (i.e. Facebook friends) are more likely to be 
successful.  
 The distance between entrepreneurs and investors was studied by Agrawal, Catalini and 
Goldfarb (2011).  Using data from the Sellaband music platform, the average distance was 3,000 
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miles between between the entrepreneur and investor for funded projects.  Another interesting 
finding from the research by Agrawal et al. (2011) was that typically the first investors were 
friends and family.  This discovery helps explain how the proximity between entrepreneur and 
investor is smaller at the start of a funding campaign (Agrawal et al., 2011).  In a similar manner, 
the relationship between funding success and the distance between entrepreneurs and investors 
was also present in peer-to-peer lending environments (Burtch et al. 2013) but for reasons 
associated with local preferences for products and services.  
II.3 Equity Crowdfunding 
As of July 2015, there were 542 total crowdfunding sites in existence and 160 
crowdfunding platforms facilitating equity crowdfunding or revenue sharing models.  Worldwide 
equity crowdfunding nearly tripled in 2014 compared to 2013 with an annual growth rate of 
182% to reach $1.11bn.  However, the North American market ($787.5m) grew faster (301%) 
compared to the European market ($177.5m) growth rate (145%) in 2014 (Massolution, 2015).  
The average size of an equity crowdfunding campaigns differs significantly by region.  In 
2014, in North America the average campaign size was $175,000, 57% of the average campaign 
size in Europe, where the average was $309,124.  The highest regional averages, however, were 
in Asia (where China dominates the crowdfunding market) and Oceania (where Australia is the 
leading crowdfunding player) with average campaign sizes of $342,260 and $307,474 
respectively.  From a worldwide perspective, average equity-based campaign size has increase 
on average by 30.5% in 2013 to reach $248,035 and a further 11.06% in 2014 to reach $275,461. 
This increase in average size indicates that the average size of a successfully funded equity-based 
campaign has increased by $145% since 2011.  
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The total funding volume of equity crowdfunding platforms was approximately $1.11bn 
in 2004.  Between 75% to 90% of this amount was raised on seven crowdfunding platforms: 
EquityNet ($250 million - $300 million), Fundable ($150 million), AngelList ($100 million), 
Crowdfunder ($75 million - $100 million), CrowdCube ($75 million - $100 million), 
WeAreCrowdfunding ($50 million - $75 million) and OurCrowd ($50 million - $75 million). 
Therefore, the majority of this amount occurred on sites based in the United States and these 
figures are expected to continue to grow (Massolution, 2015). 
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III RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 In this section, I develop a framework based on Spence (1973) and Plummer, Allison and 
Connelly (2015) for how third party affiliations are related to online funding amounts.  In this 
context, I define and use three different third party affiliations based on reputation signaling: (1) 
business accelerator affiliation; (2) investor syndicate affiliation; and finally (3) featured startups 
on the AngelList equity crowdfunding platform. 
III.1 Information Asymmetry  
 Two different types of information impact the decision processes used by companies, 
individuals and governments.  Information that is widely available to the public and is known as 
public information, and information that is only available to a limited group of individuals, 
which is known as private information.  Individuals base decisions on the character of the 
information and according to Stiglitz (2002), when “different individuals know different things,” 
information asymmetries occur.  Therefore, when information is not known publicly, information 
asymmetries occur among individuals who are aware of the details of such information, and 
those who may have been able to make more informed decisions if they had access to the 
information. 
 Historically, decision-making processes for formal economic models were based on the 
assumption of perfect information and information asymmetries were overlooked (Stiglitz, 
2002).  The economists assumed that marketplaces faced with information asymmetries would 
operate the same way as marketplaces with perfect information (Stiglitz, 2000).  The Nobel Prize 
in Economics was presented in 2001 to George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for 
their efforts in studying information economics.  Academics have dedicated much of their 
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careers in order to understand the magnitude to which information asymmetry impacts 
marketplace decision-making.  
 According to Stiglitz (2000), the categories of information where asymmetry plays a 
critical role are quality and intent.  In terms of quality, it is significant when one individual or 
company is not entirely cognizant of the characteristics of the other party.  Whereas, the same 
can be true when one party is apprehensive about another party’s conduct or objectives (Elitzur 
& Gavious, 2003).  For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on the role of third party 
affiliation signals in order to understand how investors resolve information asymmetries in 
relation to an entrepreneur’s latent and unobservable quality in an equity crowdfunding context.  
III.2 Signaling Theory   
Signaling theory has an intuitive nature which explains why many find it to be persuasive 
in nature too.  Spence, who was the first to put forth this theory, was asked by a journalist if it 
might be possible that a person could obtain the Nobel Prize in Economics by observing that 
participants in marketplaces are not aware of the information that other participants in the 
marketplace may hope to share (Spence, 2002).  Spence answered that the correct response was 
most likely “no” and thus the increase in the capturing of informational aspects of marketplace 
configurations.  The underlying basis of signaling theory is assigning a cost to information 
acquirement activities.  These costs help to resolve information asymmetries.  
 Spence (1973) used the labor market in his explanation of signaling theory in order to 
design the signaling function of education.  In many circumstances, employers do not have 
enough knowledge about the quality of potential job applicants.  To help reduce information 
asymmetries, potential applicants would often highlight their educational background to signal 
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quality.  Employers would regard education as a quality signal since lower quality candidates are 
not capable of meeting the demands of higher education.  
 Another example, which helps explain a signaling model is illustrated by Kirmani and 
Rao (2000).  As with most examples of signaling theory, Kirmani and Rao (2000) delineate 
among two characteristics: high-quality companies and low-quality companies.  Even though the 
companies are aware of their own true nature, individuals who are considered outsiders such as 
investors and consumers do not know this information asymmetry exists.  For that reason, every 
company can decide whether or not to signal its actual quality to outsiders.  If a high-quality 
company decides to signal, they obtain Outcome A, in consequence, if the company does not 
signal they obtain Outcome B.  Consequently, low-quality companies will obtain Outcome C 
upon the decision to signal, and Outcome D upon the decision not to signal.  Therefore, the use 
of signaling is an appropriate tactic for high-quality firms once A > B and once C > D.  This 
example is even more evident when high-quality companies are interested in signaling and low-
quality companies are not, resulting in a separating equilibrium.  When this happens, outsiders 
(such as investors) can differentiate between high-quality and low-quality companies. 
Consequently, a pooling equilibrium results (Cadsby, Frank & Maksimovic, 1990) when high-
quality companies and low-quality companies benefit from signaling together.  When this 
happens, outsiders cannot distinguish clearly between both types of companies.  
 Several examples demonstrating these relationships have been developed by financial 
economists.  For example, Ross (1973) illustrated how firm debt represents a signal of quality 
and Bhattacharya (1979) demonstrated how dividends also provide a signal of quality to 
investors.  The separating equilibrium example is best explained via interest or dividend 
payments as only high-quality companies have the capability of paying whereas low-quality 
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companies are unable to maintain the expense on their balance sheets.  Therefore, these signals 
of quality greatly effect lender and investor perceptions.  Understandably so, many of the 
concepts of signaling theory are based in the economic and financial literature (Riley, 2001). 
 The distinguishing characteristic of signaling is quality.  However, quality can be inferred 
in different methods.  According to Spence (1973), quality is the unobservable ability of the 
individual signaled by the achievement of education.  In contrast, Ross (1973) views quality as 
the unobservable ability of an organization to achieve returns greater than the cost of capital in 
order to generate positive cash flow.  For the purposes of this dissertation, quality will refer to 
the ability of the entrepreneur (signaler) to achieve funding from investors (outsiders) who are 
observing the third party affiliation signal in the context of an equity crowdfunding platform 
(e.g., AngelList). 
 The relationship between information asymmetry and signaling theory is illustrated by 
the timeline in Figure 2.  The timeline describes three primary entities, the entrepreneur as the 
signaler, the investor as the receiver and the signal being sent.  The illustration also accounts for 
a possible feedback loop between the entrepreneur and the investor within the constraints and 
noise of the signaling environment.  In the context of equity crowdfunding, the crowdfunding 
platform typically encompasses the sending and receiving of multiple signals between 
entrepreneurs and investors.  For example, an investor may observe multiple and sometimes 
competing signals sent by the entrepreneurs of a company.  For the purposes of this illustration, 
we explain the theoretical concept in the simplest form with an entrepreneur and investor 
communicating using one signal.  The method is consistent in the way signaling theory has been 
described for transaction-specific information.   
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t = 0 t =1 t = 2 t = 3 
ENTREPRENUER SIGNAL INVESTOR FEEDBACK 
Underlying quality 
(third party 
affiliation) 
Sent to investor Observes and 
interprets signal  
Sent to entrepreneur  
 
Signaling Environment 
Note: t = time 
Figure 2: Signaling Timeline 
III.2.1 Signaler  
 The foundation of signaling theory is the concept of entrepreneurs (signalers) as insiders 
who obtain information that is not available to investors (e.g. outsiders).  The entrepreneurs 
acquire or have information, both positive and negative, which investors would consider material 
and useful.  This acquired information could be comprised of details such as the performance of 
the services and products of the company.  It could also include information regarding initial 
research and development results or the the companies’ sale pipeline.  Other types of 
information, such as pending lawsuits or patent disclosures, are also acquired by entrepreneurs. 
This confidential information gives entrepreneurs an advantage regarding the quality they wish 
to portray to investors.  
III.2.2 Signal 
Entrepreneurs acquire both positive and negative information and must decide how to 
share this information with investors.  The basis of signaling theory is communicating positive 
information about the startup in order to positively impact startup qualities and attributes.  Few 
academic researchers have investigated actions that have been taken by entrepreneurs, which 
resulted in the communication of negative information regarding startup attributes or quality.  
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For example, issuing new equity in a company is generally considered a negative signal since 
historically the issuing of new equity is conducted when the price of the company’s stock is 
inflated (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  Entrepreneurs need to guard their actions in order to not send 
negative signals since this reduces information asymmetry in a counterintuitive manner.  
The focus of signaling theory is the actions entrepreneurs take to purposely communicate 
positive and sometimes imperceptible qualities.  However, not all of these actions are useful as 
signals.  Investors are typically inundated with observable actions by entrepreneurs and must sort 
through the noise of the signaling environment in order to identify signals of quality.  There are 
two main features of effective signals: signal observability and cost.  Signal observability 
signifies the extent to which investors are capable of perceiving the signal.  If actions are not 
easily perceived by investors, then they have not risen above the noise of the signaling 
environment.  The theory of costly signaling (BliegeBird, Smith, Alvard, Chibnik, Cronk, 
Giordani & Smith, 2005) illustrates the second feature of effective signals.  The cost associated 
with signaling is based on principal that some entrepreneurs absorb costs better than others.  For 
instance, the cost of obtaining a patent can be expensive, but makes for the threat of entry by 
competitors less likely and makes false signaling problematic.  However, obtaining patents is 
less costly for high-quality entrepreneurs in comparison to low-quality entrepreneurs due to 
experience curve effects.  If an entrepreneur sends a signal without the underlying quality but is 
confident the signal outweighs the cost of sending the signal, then the entrepreneur is trying to 
falsely signal to investors.  In these situations, misrepresentative signals would quickly escalate 
until investors learn to disregard the signals altogether.  Therefore, to maintain the effectiveness 
of signals, costs must be controlled so that disingenuous signals do not profit.  
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III.2.3 Receiver  
 The investor (receiver) is the third characteristic of the signaling timeline.  Investors are 
essentially outsiders, who lack information and would like to receive information regarding the 
startup or entrepreneur.  In addition, entrepreneurs and investors could have slightly conflicting 
interests which could lead to a successful lie providing an advantage to the entrepreneur at the 
cost of the investor (BliegeBird et al., 2005).  For signaling to occur effectively, the entrepreneur 
should profit from the investor in some way.  For instance, the entrepreneur might offer the 
investor some alternatives such as choice about investing in debt or equity.  Previous peer-
reviewed academic research has tested signaling theory in a variety of settings including 
shareholders and debtholders as receivers (Certo, Daily & Dalton, 2001; Elliott, Prevost & Rao, 
2009).  A key component of signaling is that investors will benefit in the same manner as the 
entrepreneur from the decisions generated by the information obtained from signals.  To be 
specific, investors will profit from acquiring shares in a startup that signals a productive and 
profitable future and the same is true for the entrepreneur.  
III.3 Reputation  
 Traditional markets for the financing of early-stage startups rely heavily on due diligence 
predicated on face-to-face interactions and personal relationships.  In the equity crowdfunding 
setting, entrepreneurs disclose as much information as they wish and then rely on an ethos of 
“trust me”.  Third party affiliations (business accelerators, investor syndicates, and crowdfunding 
intermediaries) may influence the efficacy of a “trust me” environment by facilitating markets 
for reputation.  In other words, in equity crowdfunding markets, as in many other online markets, 
reputation and trust are particularly important. The important role of reputation as a mechanism 
for establishing trust to address the risk of fraud in online transactions was emphasized by Cabral 
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(2012) by stating: “While there are various mechanisms to deal with fraud, reputation is one of 
the best candidates – and arguably one of of the more effective ones”.  Intermediaries (e.g., 
AngelList) have developed mechanisms for establishing trust through reputation.  Bernstein, 
Korteweg and Laws (2014) demonstrated the importance of networks in signaling quality in an 
equity crowdfunding context.  In their empirical analysis, they used reputation as an information 
category by measuring the number of followers on the AngelList platform.  For the purposes of 
this dissertation, I also measure the reputation of the third party affiliations (business accelerator, 
investor syndicate) with the number followers on AngelList.  
III.4 Third Party Signaling  
 Third party signaling is more important at the early stage of investment.  Investing in a 
startup generally has considerable information asymmetry and more unpredictability than that 
which exists for an IPO (Kirsch, Goldfarb, & Gera, 2009).  Startups typically offer less reliable 
information to their investors, and when seeking potential investors to invest capital in their 
startups, they may provide investors with information that is selective and unregulated or 
misleading.  In truth, startups may not be able to provide sufficient information simply because 
they do not yet possess a proven track record that allows them to demonstrate what they have 
accomplished in the past with their money and what they have managed to achieve.  That is why 
the signals available to investors tend to be rather ambiguous and unpredictable.  In addition, 
investors, at this initial stage of investment, are offered a great number of choices and 
opportunities to consider.  This unfortunately increases the noisiness and commotion of the 
signaling environment, thus making it difficult for signals to be perceived (Pollock & Gulati, 
2007), and complicates an investor’s evaluation of the startup.  Therefore, the challenge of 
influencing investors and having the credibility to convey the startup’s potential in an 
 28 
 
environment where signals are not perceived clearly, makes it more important than ever for 
entrepreneurs to align with third party affiliations. 
III.4.1 Business Accelerator 
Supporting organizations such as a business accelerator that helps new startups launch 
and grow are important third party affiliation signals.  According to Cohen & Hochberg (2014), 
business accelerators provide startups with mentorship, networking assistance, and access to 
subsequent funding in exchange for a fee.  Examples of prominent business accelerators include 
AngelPad, Techstars, and Y Combinator.  A number of resources are provided by business 
accelerators to support early-stage growth for startups (Clouse & Austrian, 2011).  For instance, 
Y Combinator provides each batch of startups with initial access to capital for three months and a 
network of investors for follow-on rounds.  The startups accepted into Y Combinator, after a 
highly selective application process, are provided with office space and a group of experienced 
mentors to offer advice and help with identifying potential customers, partners and vendors.  
Affiliation with a successful business accelerator such as Y Combinator serves as a meaningful 
signal to investors.  In addition, business accelerators must maintain their reputations.  Thus, 
business accelerators serve as an effective third party signal to investors by endorsing the quality 
of the startup (Lee, Pollock & Jin, 2011).  
H1: Affiliation with a business accelerator will be positively associated with online funding 
amounts. 
III.4.2 Investor Syndicate  
 Angel investors and venture capital firms have been using syndication for a very long 
time (Lerner, 1994).  This model has now been transferred to equity crowdfunding for a different 
purpose (Agrawal, Catalini & Goldfarb, 2015).  Essentially, a lead investor (i.e. investor 
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syndicate) who has access to startup deal flow and is good at evaluating startups can now transfer 
those deals online for the crowd to invest.  What is happening is a curation function as the 
investor syndicate is selecting startups that are likely to succeed.  These lead investors, acting as 
a third party affiliation, are essentially substituting the signal of the entrepreneur.  
 If the startup is successful (acquisition or exit), the investor syndicate will earn a carry 
(percentage of the upside) and this is a strong incentive for the lead investor.  However, if the 
startup is unsuccessful, the reputation of that investor syndicate will suffer.  The crowd (capital 
providers) find this setup ideal as it solves issues of information asymmetry and the difficulties 
of assessing the quality of a startup at an early stage. 
 This is also the reason why early stage startup investment is geographically localized 
(Wiltbank & Boeker, 2007).  Angel investors typically invest in their respective geographical 
area because they want to meet the entrepreneur and evaluate the quality of the startup.  
However, in this new model of equity crowdfunding, online investor syndicates are overtaking 
the model of direct investment (Agrawal et al., 2015).  The investor syndicate approach 
leverages the offline networks and reputation of lead investors by serving as a third party 
affiliation.  
H2: Affiliation with an investor syndicate will be positively associated with online funding 
amounts. 
III.4.3 Featured Startup 
 Previous research examining donation crowdfunding has identified a positive correlation 
between promotion by crowdfunding platforms and subsequent funding success.  The findings 
indicate that being featured on Kickstarter has the greatest positive effect on subsequent pledges 
(Qiu, 2013).  In a similar manner, AngelList also provides a “curation” function to feature 
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startups from an equity crowdfunding perspective.  The AngelList team and a rotating group of 
analysts from the top venture capital firms review investor syndicated startups after they are 
published and feature the companies to investors (Bernstein et al., 2014).  As an intermediary, 
AngelList does not perform due diligence and does not focus on proposed transaction terms. 
However, AngelList does believe that this curation function is valuable to startups, which may 
not have the experience or the expertise to know that particular investors on the platform may be 
able to help them.  In addition, this curation function is also valuable to investors as they might 
not have the time to examine all the different startups investments on the platform.  AngelList, 
acting as a third party affiliation, describes this review process for featured startups as something 
similar to the due diligence process of a venture investor and thus shares a similar requirement to 
maintain a strong reputation. 
H3: Featured startups on AngelList have a higher online funding amount. 
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IV METHOD 
 
The source of the data is the AngelList equity crowdfunding platform.  AngelList was 
founded in 2010 to operate a website (http://angel.co) allowing startups seeking investors to meet 
and communicate with each other.  As of January 2016, over 775 startups have successfully 
raised $255 million in funding online via AngelList, and it is one of only a few equity 
crowdfunding intermediaries that possess sufficient data for a statistically significant analysis. 
Therefore, research on AngelList is a forward-looking illustration of how equity crowdfunding is 
changing as of May 16, 2016 in the United States with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
passing final rules for Title IV of the Jumpstart of Business Startups (JOBS) Act (SEC, 2015) 
permitting unaccredited investors to participate in equity crowdfunding.   
IV.1 Investment Process 
 Typically, startups begin on AngelList by creating a profile for their company.  A startup 
can post information about itself, its products or services, and its management team, and that 
information is publicly available.  Startups can also post information, including potential 
fundraising activities, company traction, and investor pitch decks on a restricted portion of the 
website that is not publicly available.  In order to gain access to the restricted portion of the 
website, a potential investor must be an accredited investor.  AngelList requires proof of 
accreditation from investors to meet the more stringent standards the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission has put in place, the 506(c) standard.  
 Investors can also create a profile on AngelList describing their background, portfolio, 
and anticipated number and dollar size of investments.  As of January 2016, there were 25,030 
investors listed on the AngelList platform.  Investors can use the platform to sort startups by 
various criteria, such as location, market, technology, and industry focus.  
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 Investor syndicates can be formed on AngelList by accredited individuals, angel groups, 
and venture capital funds.  A typical investor syndicate who creates a profile online will provide 
basic information such as how many deals per year they expect to syndicate and the typical 
investment size.  The lead investor of the syndicate also provides a written investment thesis for 
all investments in addition to disclosing any potential conflicts of interest.  When other 
accredited investors which to invest alongside the lead investor, they are referred to as “backers”.  
If accepted by the lead investor, the backer agrees to invest in the lead investors syndicated deals 
on the same terms and to also pay a carry fee.  All of these investments occur on the AngelList 
equity crowdfunding platform.   
 Although it is not encouraged, backers are able to opt out of specific deals that do not 
align with their investment interests.  As mentioned previously, backers also pay a carry per deal 
(0% - 30%) to the lead investor syndicate as well as 5% carry to AngelList.  Thus, investor 
syndicates operate in a similar manner to venture capitalists except for these differences: 
syndicate investors can opt out of any deal or stop investing any time; syndicates have much 
lower minimums; syndicates are available to the general (accredited) public; lead investors 
typically personally invest more per deal than general partners of venture capital funds; 
syndicates use a deal carry; and syndicates do not charge management fees. 
 To illustrate how this works, AngelList provides the following example on its website: 
“Sara, a notable angel, decides to lead a syndicate.  Investors “back” her syndicate by agreeing to 
invest $200K in each of her future deals and pay her a 15% carry.  The next time Sara decides to 
invest in a startup, she asks the company for a $250K allocation.  She personally invests $50K in 
the startup and offers an opportunity to invest up to $200K to her backers.”  As of January 2016, 
AngelList has approximately 170 active syndicates.  
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IV.2 Data Set Construction  
The final data sample contains 320 equity crowdfunding startup investments published on 
the AngelList platform between June 2013 and January 2016.  Each of these startup investments 
were funded by either a combination of online and offline accredited investors.  This sample 
represents the most comprehensive equity crowdfunding investment data collected in the United 
States.  AngelList provided a list of the 320 investments for which I was then able to build a 
number of datasets using the AngelList application programming interface (API).  According to 
Joshua Slayton (Chief Technology Officer at AngelList), many of the investments are private 
and unfortunately cannot be announced, which clarifies the discrepancy between available 
investments (775) and the number of total investments (320) accessible on the website.  
However, all available investments were displayed in the same manner on AngelList, and all 
follow the general structure described above, thus ensuring comparability.  For our sample of 
320 startups, I collected five types of data: (1) online funding amount, (2) business accelerators, 
(3) investor syndicates, (4) startups featured on the equity crowdfunding platform, and (5) 
control variables.  
In order to test our hypotheses, I use the following variables:  
Dependent Variable 
 
Online Round Amount.  This measure indicates the total online funding amount that was 
generated by the startup. 
 
Table 3: Top Five Online Round Amounts 
Startup Amount 
PillPack $4,300,000 
Beepi $2,800,000 
MD Insider $1,500,000 
Life360 $1,200,000 
Contactually $1,000,000 
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Independent Variables 
 
Business Accelerator.  This dichotomous variable (0/1) indicates whether a startup is affiliated 
with a business accelerator. 
 
Quality:  An integer between 0 and 10, calculated every 48 hours, and reflects the 
business accelerator’s rank on AngelList.  Higher numbers mean better quality.  
 
Table 4: Representative Sample of Business Accelerator Quality 
Business Accelerator Quality 
TechStars 10 
Y Combinator 10 
Seedcamp 8 
Founder Institute 7 
Mass Challenge 6 
 
Followers:  Number of users who subscribe to business accelerator’s information on 
AngelList. Followers is also a measure of a business accelerator’s importance and 
reputation.  
 
Table 5: Top Five Business Accelerator Followers 
Business Accelerator Followers 
500 Startups 27,092 
Y Combinator 8,487 
AngelPad 7,657 
TechStars 6,408 
Seedcamp 6,303 
 
Investor Syndicate.  This dichotomous variable (0/1) indicates whether a startup is affiliated with 
an investor syndicate.  
 
Backed Amount:  This measure indicates the total amount of funding available to the 
investor syndicate. 
 
Table 6: Top Five Investor Syndicate Backed Amounts 
Investor Syndicate Amount 
Late Stage Pre-IPO @ Flight.vc $6,500,000 
Gil Penchina @ Flight.vc $6,300,000 
Tim Ferriss $5,800,000 
Paige Craig $4,200,000 
Arena Ventures $4,200,000 
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Minimum Investment:  This measure indicates the minimum investment required by a 
backer to be accepted into an investor syndicate.  
 
Table 7: Top Five Investor Syndicate Minimum Investments 
Investor Syndicate Amount 
Accomplice $100,000 
Mike Baker $25,000 
Brick & Mortar Venture $12,500 
500 Startups $10,000 
Brendan Wallace $10,000 
 
Backed Accredited Investors:  This measure indicates the total number of accredited 
investors backing an investor syndicate. 
 
Table 8: Top Five Investor Syndicate Backed Accredited Investors 
Investor Syndicate  Number 
Gil Penchina @ Flight.vc 1,117 
Tim Ferriss 1,107 
Jason Calacanis 870 
Dave Morin 538 
SaaS Startups by Flight.vc 443 
 
Notable Investors:  This measure indicates the total number of notable investors (as 
identified by AngelList) within an investor syndicate.  
 
Table 9: Top Five Investor Syndicate Notable Investors 
Investor Syndicate  Number 
Naval Ravikant 13 
Paige Craig 10 
Elad Gil 10 
Gil Penchina @ Flight.vc 9 
Jason Calacanis 8 
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Syndicated Investments:  This measure indicates the total number of syndicate investment 
deals by the investor syndicate.  
 
Table 10: Top Five Investor Syndicate Syndicated Investments 
Investor Syndicate  Number 
FG Angels 59 
Yun-Fang Juan 32 
Scott and Cyan Banister 22 
Barbara Corcoran Venture Partners 14 
Jason Calacanis  13 
 
Exits:  This measure indicates the total number of startup exits by the investor syndicate.  
 
Table 11: Top Five Investor Syndicate Exits 
Investor Syndicate  Number 
500 Startups 68 
Naval Ravikant 41 
Dave Morin 27 
Betaworks 25 
Scott and Cyan Banister 25 
 
Syndicate Followers:  Number of users who subscribe to an investor syndicate’s 
information on AngelList.  Followers is also a measure of an investor syndicate’s 
importance and reputation. 
 
Table 12: Top Five Investor Syndicate Followers 
Investor Syndicate  Number 
Naval Ravikant 44,285 
Jason Calacanis 41,442 
Dave Morin 34,838 
500 Startups 27,037 
Tim Ferriss 26,173 
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Featured Startup.  This dichotomous variable (0/1) indicates whether a startup was featured on 
AngelList.  
 
Table 13: Top Five Featured Startups by Online Funding Amounts 
Investor Syndicate  Amount 
Life360 $1,200,000 
InDinero $897,000 
Fitmob $824,000 
Vulcun $779,000 
Authy $754,000 
 
Additional Controls 
 
Financing Round:  This measure indicates the stage in the startups current funding which is 
classified into six categories; ‘Seed’, ‘Series A’, ‘Series B’, ‘Series C’, ‘Round’, and ‘Closed’. 
‘Seed’ funding is an investment in early-stage startups before ‘Series A’, and usually angel 
investors and venture capitalists invest in seed rounds.  Series A, B, C are sequential rounds, 
whereas ‘Seed’ and ‘Round’ are not.  The ‘Seed’ round can be skipped by getting ‘Series A’ 
funding.  
 
Startup Location:  This dichotomous variable (0/1) indicates whether a startup was located in 
California or in another location.  
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V RESULTS 
 
 The result section provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.  In addition, 
the independent samples t-test is used to test hypotheses 1 through 3, respectively.  I find support 
for only hypotheses 2, which states that affiliation with an investor syndicate will be positively 
associated with online funding amounts.  Lastly, a Tobit model regression was performed to 
estimate linear relationships between variables.  
V.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics 
 Number of 
observation 
Mean SD Min Max 
Online Funding Amount 320 $302,472 $333,019 $45,000 $4,300,000 
      
Business Accelerator 320 0.55  0 1 
     Quality  320 4.87 4.51 0 10 
     Followers  320 3,595 6,721 0 27,092 
      
Investor Syndicate 320 0.85  0 1 
     Backed Amount 320 $1,037,929 $1,420,441 0 $6,500,000 
     Minimum Investment 320 $3,669 $8,639 0 $100,000 
     Lead Investor Investment 320 $36,525 $42,620 0 $300,000 
     Backed Accredited Investors 320 178 252 0 1,117 
     Notable Investors 320 2.21 3.13 0 13 
     Syndicated Investments 320 10.67 17.90 0 59 
     Exits 320 5.93 10.31 0 68 
     Followers  320 6,800 11,127 0 44,285 
      
Featured Startup 320 0.32  0 1 
      
Financing Round 320 2.61 1.82 1 6 
Startup Location 320 0.61  0 1 
      
 
Notes: This table shows the mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum value (min), and 
maximum value (max) for all variables.  The sample covers 320 AngelList investments. 
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V.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 15: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Notes: This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for variables in Table 3 – p-values are given in parentheses below the 
coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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V.3 Independent Samples T-Test 
 
V.3.1 Business Accelerator 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare online funding amounts for 
startups with affiliations to business accelerators and no affiliation to business accelerators.  
Table 16: T-Test for Business Accelerator Affiliation 
Group Statistics 
 IV_BA N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Online Funding 
Amount 
0 144 308395.83 299722.347 24976.862 
1 176 297625.00 358745.108 27041.430 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Online 
Funding 
Amount 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.228 .633 .287 318 .774 10770 37474.102 -62957.662 84499.328 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  .293 317.853 .770 $10770 36811.446 -61654.046 83195.713 
 
There was not a significant difference in the scores for startups with an affiliation to a 
business accelerator (M = $297,625, SD = $358,745) and no affiliation to business accelerators 
(M = $308,395, SD = $299,722) conditions; t (318) = 0.287, p = 0.774.  The results suggest that 
online funding amounts are not impacted by affiliations with business accelerators.  Specifically, 
the results suggest that when a startup has an affiliation with a business accelerator, it does not 
impact their online funding amounts on AngelList.  
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V.3.2 Investor Syndicate 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare online funding amounts for 
startups with affiliations to an investor syndicate and no affiliation to an investor syndicate.  
Table 17: T-Test for Investor Syndicate Affiliation 
Group Statistics 
 Investor Syndicate N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Online Funding 
Amount 
0 46 222978.26 208371.195 30722.657 
1 274 315817.52 348120.095 21030.704 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Online 
Funding 
Amount 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.300 .584 1.755 318 .080 92839.257 52890.442 -196898.660 11220.145 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  2.494 93.664 .014 92839.257 37231.333 -166766.403 18912.112 
 
 
There was significant difference in the scores for startups with affiliations to an investor 
syndicate (M = $315,817, SD = $348,120) and no affiliation to an investor syndicate (M = 
$222,978, SD = $208,371) conditions; t (318) = 2.494, p = 0.014.  The results suggest that online 
funding amounts are impacted by affiliations with investor syndicates.  Specifically, the results 
suggest that when a startup has an affiliation with an investor syndicate, it impacts their online 
funding amounts on AngelList. 
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V.3.3 Featured Startup   
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare online funding amounts for 
featured startups on AngelList and for startups that were not featured on AngelList  
Table 18: T-Test for Featured Startup Affiliation 
Group Statistics 
 Featured Startup N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Online Funding 
Amount 
0 217 315769.59 380608.033 25837.357 
1 103 274456.31 197236.485 19434.288 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Online 
Funding 
Amount 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.712 .192 1.037 318 .301 41313.275 39842.242 -37074.422 119700.971 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  1.278 315.614 .202 41313.275 32330.490 -22297.247 104923.797 
 
There was not a significant difference in the scores for startups featured on AngelList (M 
= $274,456, SD = $197,236) and for startups not featured on AngelList (M = $315,769, SD = 
$380,608) conditions; t (318) = 1.037, p = 0.301.  The results suggest that online funding 
amounts are not impacted by startups featured on AngelList.  Specifically, the results suggest 
that when a startup is featured on AngelList, it does not impact their online funding amounts. 
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V.3.4 Startup Location   
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare online funding amounts for 
startups located in California and for startups that were located outside of California. 
Table 19: T-Test for California Startup Location 
Group Statistics 
 Startup Location N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Online Funding 
Amount 
0 126 310976.19 396524.975 35325.252 
1 194 296948.45 285291.393 20482.728 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Online 
Funding 
Amount 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.015 .903 .368 318 .713 14027.737 38154.591 -61039.587 89095.061 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  .344 207.956 .732 14027.737 40834.001 -66473.926 94529.400 
 
 
There was not a significant difference in the scores for startups located in California (M = 
$296,948, SD = $285,291) and for startups not located in California (M = $310,976, SD = 
$396,524) conditions; t (318) = 0.368, p = 0.713.  The results suggest that online funding 
amounts are not impacted on startups located in California.  Specifically, the results suggest that 
when a startup is located is located in California, it does not impact their online funding amounts.  
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V.4 Tobit Model 
 A Tobit model, also called a censored regression model, was conducted to estimate linear 
relationships between variables with left-censoring at 0 of the dependent variable online funding 
amount.  The range of possible online funding amounts is 0 to infinity.  The dependent variable 
(online funding amount) was rescaled by 1,000.  In addition, the following variables were log 
transformed to improve model fit: business accelerator followers, investor syndicate backed 
amount, investor syndicate minimum investment, investor syndicate syndicated investments, and 
investor syndicate followers.  
Table 20: Tobit Model Fit Summary 
Summary Statistics of Continuous Responses 
Variable Mean Standard 
Error 
Type Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
N Obs 
Lower 
Bound 
N Obs 
Upper 
Bound 
Online 
Funding 
Amount 
302.471 333.0185 Censored 0  0  
 
Model Fit Summary 
Number of Endogenous Variables 1 
Endogenous Variable Online Funding Amount  
Number of Observations 320 
Log Likelihood -2270 
Maximum Absolute Gradient 4.6983E-13 
Number of Iterations 0 
Optimization Method Quasi-Newton 
AIC 4562 
Schwarz Criterion 4603 
 
The Summary Statistics of Continuous Responses provides a summary of the number of 
left censored values.  The section labeled Model Fit Summary includes information on the 
number of observations (320), the number of iterations it took the model to converge (0), the 
final log likelihood (-2270), and the AIC (4562) and Schwarz Criterion (4603), also known as 
BIC.  The AIC and Schwarz Criterion were used to compare models results.  
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Table 21: Tobit Model Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Approx Pr > |t| 
Intercept  1 192.468 40.054 4.18 <.0001 
      
Business Accelerator      
Quality 1 -25.050 14.485 -1.73 0.0838 
Followers 1 31.208 16.106 1.94 0.0527 
      
Investor Syndicate      
Exits 1 4.828 2.452 1.97 0.0490 
Backed Amount 1 -55.0328 16.106 1.94 <.0001 
Backed Accredited Investors 1 0.713 0.108 6.57 <.0001 
Backed Notable Investors 1 23.811 9.085 2.62 0.0088 
Minimum Investment 1 90.407 12.297 7.35 <.0001 
Syndicated Investments 1 -2.000 0.992 -2.01 0.0439 
Followers 1 -9.779 3.238 -3.02 0.0025 
      
_Sigma 1 291.317 11.515 25.30 <.0001 
 
Under the heading Parameter Estimates we see the coefficients, their standard errors, the t-
statistics, and associated p-values.  The coefficients for business accelerator quality and 
followers is marginally significant.  Whereas the coefficients for investor syndicate exits, backed 
accredited investors, notable investors, minimum investment, syndicated investments, and 
followers is statistically significant.  
Tobit regression coefficients are interpreted in a similar manner to OLS regression 
coefficients; however, the linear effect is on the uncensored latent variable, not the observed 
outcome (McDonald & Moffitt, 1980).  
The inference for this Tobit model concerns only model parameters with p-values <0.10.  
The model results are as follows: 
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• A one-unit increase in business accelerator quality is associated with a $25,050 
decrease in the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result is marginally 
statistically significant. 
 
• A one percent increase in business accelerator followers is associated with a $31,208 
increase in the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result is marginally 
statistically significant.  
 
• A one-unit increase in investor syndicate exits is associated with a $4,828 increase in 
the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result is statistically significant.  
 
• A one percent increase in investor syndicate backed amount is associated with a 
$55,032 decrease in the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result is 
highly statistically significant.  
 
• A one-unit increase in investor syndicate backed investors is associated with a $713 
increase in the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result is highly 
statistically significant.  
 
• A one-unit increase in investor syndicate notable investors is associated with a 
$23,811 increase in the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result is 
highly statistically significant.  
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• A one percent increase in investor syndicate minimum investment is associated with a 
$90,407 increase in the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result is 
highly statistically significant.  
 
• A one-unit increase in investor syndicate syndicated investments is associated with a 
$2,000 decrease in the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result 
statistically significant.  
 
• A one percent increase in investor syndicate followers is associated with a $9,779 
decrease in the predicted value of online funding amounts.  The result is highly 
statistically significant.  
 
The ancillary statistic _sigma: is equivalent to the square root of the residual variance in OLS 
regression.  The value of 291.317 can be compared to the standard deviation of online funding 
amount which is 333.018, a substantial reduction.  That _sigma is statistically significant means 
that the estimated coefficient (291.317) is statistically significantly different from 0. 
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VI DISCUSSION 
 
VI.1 Discussion of Findings 
  In terms of business accelerators (hypotheses 1), the results were surprising as there was 
not a significant difference in the online funding amounts for startups with an affiliation to a 
business accelerator.  One of the many benefits of a business accelerator is assistance with 
fundraising efforts (Chang, 2013).  However, a number of venture capitalists, namely Chris 
Lynch from Accomplice, have publicly waged war on the benefits of business accelerators 
(Garland, 2014).  What was also unanticipated is that as business accelerator quality (measure of 
past success) increases the predicted likelihood of online funding amounts decreases.  Again, this 
seems counterintuitive to the benefits associated with top-tier business accelerators (AngelPad, 
TechStars, and Y Combinator).  The only explanation that I can provide is that as the quality of 
the business accelerator increases the more likely it is that the startup has learned to successfully 
bootstrap by selling early customers rather than raising money from investors (Ebben & Johnson, 
2006).  Whereas quality had a negative impact, business accelerator followers (measure of 
reputation) increased the predicted likelihood of online funding amounts.  The result is consistent 
with expectations and more research is needed in this area as business accelerator quality and 
followers were both marginally statistically significant.  
 In contrast, investor syndicates (hypotheses 2) had a significant difference in the online 
funding amounts for startups with an affiliation.  What is interesting in terms of the results from 
the Tobit model is that the findings reinforce what is known in academic literature.  Namely, that 
the availability of exit opportunities is important to both angel investors and venture capitalists 
(Giot et al., 2007; Schwienbacher, 2008).  Thus, investor syndicates with a higher number of past 
exits increase the likelihood of predicted online funding amounts.  
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 Another interesting finding from investor syndicates (hypotheses 2) is the contradiction 
between backed amount, backed investors, syndicated investments, and syndicate followers 
versus notable investors and minimum investment amount.  The results indicate that a higher 
number of notable investors and a higher minimum investment amount significantly increases 
the predicted value of online funding amounts.  Whereas, the higher backed amounts, backed 
investors, syndicated investments, and syndicate followers has negative and almost neutral 
predicted values for online funding amounts.  The only explanation that I provide is the 
consequence of herding behavior among social networks (Zhang & Liu, 2012).  The investor 
syndicates with large backed amounts, backed investors, syndicated investments and followers 
are pack animals and tend to want to get in on “hot” deals (Scoble, 2011).  Said differently, 
Bryce Roberts (notable investor) described how he deleted his AngelList account because his 
interest was in ideas and startups that most investors aren’t, so heat was generally a false signal. 
In response, Jason Calacanis (investor syndicate with high number of backers, syndicated 
investments, and followers) commented that “where there is heat that is a signal of quality” 
(Roberts, 2011).  Clearly, what I have described with these findings is two differentiating 
investment strategies of investor syndicates operating as third party affiliation signals.  
 Another surprising outcome was the impact of featured startups on the AngelList 
platform (hypothesis 3).  Previous research examining donation-based crowdfunding identified a 
positive correlation between promotion by the intermediary (e.g., Kickstarter) and online funding 
amounts (Qiu, 2013).  However, in the context of equity crowdfunding no such correlation 
exists.  Clearly, backers of donation based crowdfunding differ greatly than those of accredited 
investors in equity crowdfunding.  Despite the significant resources that AngelList uses to 
provide a curation “function” to feature startups, the results indicate that it does not impact 
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online funding amounts and that this function may in fact be not valuable to investors on the 
platform who do not have the time to examine in detail all the different startup investment 
opportunities.  However, unaccredited investors will have the opportunity to participate in equity 
crowdfunding as of May 16, 2016 when the SEC passes final rules for Title IV of the Jumpstart 
our Business Startups (JOBS) Act (SEC, 2015).  Perhaps this shift in policy is a forwarding 
looking illustration of how equity crowdfunding and the impact of startups featured by 
intermediaries will change.   
VI.2 Contribution to Theory  
  The dissertation offers several potential contributions.  First, whereas previous peer-
reviewed academic research generally examines the influence of signals in the context of an IPO 
(Certo et al., 2009), I examine signaling in the context of an unexplored but growing source of 
financing for startups: equity crowdfunding.  Second, I investigate how different third party 
affiliations signals (business accelerator, investor syndicate, and featured startups) impact online 
funding amounts in the context of equity crowdfunding.  The results indicate that third party 
affiliation (investor syndicates) considerably improves a startups online funding amount. 
I also contribute to theory with regards to how third party affiliation signals operate in an 
equity crowdfunding environment.  The value of third party affiliation signals is based upon their 
ability to enhance other startup signals, such as characteristics and actions that might otherwise 
go unnoticed by investors.  The findings from the dissertation support the theoretical contribution 
of third party affiliation in equity crowdfunding.  Said differently, startups characteristics and 
actions are signals that remain relatively unnoticed unless a startup combines them with a third 
party affiliation (i.e. investor syndicate) to enhance the signal value, thus increasing the 
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likelihood of online funding amounts.  Thus, the development of the theory of third party 
affiliation in equity crowdfunding  
VI.3 Limitations  
 There are also a number of limitations to the dissertation that are worthy of mention.  
First and foremost, many of the AngelList investments (59%) are private (not in public domain) 
and unfortunately cannot be analyzed by researchers.  Despite my efforts to obtain the private 
information from AngelList, this dataset (320) is the largest to date for equity crowdfunding.  
 A second limitation is that the dissertation includes several binary variables, which are 
crude measures.  These types of measures are used to distinguish between third party affiliation 
signal versus non-signal.  However, future research might build upon these measures by using 
count or continuous variables.  For example, the featured startup third party affiliation signal 
could be refined by also taking into account the number of times the startup was advertised to 
potential accredited investors and by what means of communication.  
  A third limitation is that the dissertation did not allow the opportunity to examine the 
impact of time and the sequencing of third party affiliation signals.  Thus, I can only draw 
conclusions about when third party affiliation signals are, or are not present.  This limitation 
represents an opportunity for future research by exploring how for example an investor 
syndicates level of experience (measured by number of investments), past success (measured by 
AngelList quality) and reputation (measured by the number of followers) fluctuates over time.  
 Finally, it is possible that investors on equity crowdfunding platforms (e.g., AngelList) 
may be considering other, unobservable, characteristics in their investment decisions, in addition 
to the third party affiliations I analyze for purposes of this dissertation.  It could be useful to 
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conduct a survey among investor syndicates and their backed accredited investors to explore 
their investment reasons further, and perhaps learn more about market dynamics.  
VI.4 Future Research 
 
Equity crowdfunding is a novel form of capital acquisition that allows entrepreneurs to 
bypass financial institutions and solicit investments directly from the public.  A growing interest 
in equity crowdfunding is shared by practitioners, policymakers, the media, and scholars alike. 
The scope of equity crowdfunding and new laws facilitating equity transactions are generating 
intense media discussion of this financing method’s merits and its problems. 
 Equity crowdfunding’s emergence is creating opportunities for scholarly research.  As a 
new and powerful tool for entrepreneurs, equity crowdfunding can help push the boundaries of 
existing theory and thereby develop new theory.  Many of the entrepreneurship field’s research 
questions that involve startup success and failure, venture capital, angel investors, IPOs and 
related topics can and should be reexamined in the equity crowdfunding context to help extend 
and build theory.  
 Research on equity crowdfunding has the opportunity to inform important practical 
issues, such how might social network theory be extended to explain the roles an entrepreneur’s 
social and professional connections have in terms of funding amounts and reputation.  Equity 
crowdfunding also offers interesting policy implications.  For example, by bridging the financial 
gaps for aspiring entrepreneurs with solid ideas but little capital to support efforts to act on them, 
equity crowdfunding may lead to greater participation in entrepreneurial ecosystems, especially 
within geographic area whose financial markets are not fully developed.  
 Despite the opportunities created by equity crowdfunding research, there are also 
challenges associated with conducting research in this area.  For instance, detailed information 
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about equity crowdfunding investors is difficult to acquire on many equity crowdfunding 
platforms.  Further, some of the mechanisms that support equity crowdfunding success may take 
place off-line, making it difficult for researchers to measure them.  Research is needed that 
provides innovative solutions to deal with the challenges associated with equity crowdfunding. 
VI.5 Implications for Practice 
 For startups, the results indicate the importance of third party affiliation, namely investor 
syndicates in equity crowdfunding.  The investor syndicate model incentivizes (on a performance 
basis via a carry) lead investors to include other accredited investors (backers) in their deals.  
This enables the lead investor to make larger investments in the startup.  Therefore, the path for 
many startups and accredited investors (backers) is to affiliate and participate in the deals of their 
most capable peers (lead investors) via the investor syndicate model.  
 A strong lead investor is also bringing access to top deals that were not going to be on 
AngelList or other equity crowdfunding websites.  That is why accredited investors (backers) are 
willing to pay carry (much like traditional venture capital) to participate in the deals.  The first 
billion-dollar exit via AngelList occurred in March, 2016 (Primack, 2016).  The AngelList 
investor syndicate led by Zach Coelius privately invested $100,000 in Cruise Automation, a San 
Francisco-based developer of autonomous vehicle technology.  General Motors subsequently 
acquired the company for more than $1 billion in cash and stock.  The investor syndicate and 
subsequent investment opportunity was conducted as invite-only, which now is almost 65% of 
such deals on the AngeList platform.  
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VII CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation is the first to conduct an analysis of the effectiveness of third party 
affiliations (business accelerators, investor syndicates, and featured startups).  The data highlight 
how important the investor syndicate is to online funding amounts, such as the number of notable 
investors participating and the minimum investment amount.  It also demonstrates the 
importance of reputation (as measured by followers).  I also found, somewhat surprisingly, that 
business accelerators and startups featured on AngelList had little or no significant impact with 
regards to online funding amounts.  
 The findings have interesting implications for both policy makers and practitioners.  For 
startups that use equity crowdfunding, the data suggest that third party affiliations such as 
investor syndicates that have a high level of experience (measured by notable investor status), 
past success (measured by previous startup exits) and strong reputations (measured by the 
number of followers) can be interpreted as effective third party affiliation signals that can 
increase the likelihood of online funding amounts.  Moreover, business accelerators and featured 
startups on the AngelList platform do little to enhance the likelihood of attracting investors.  
 With respect to policy implications, the data also highlight the fact that investors on 
AngelList seem to differentiate among attributes of startup quality, and they strongly value 
credible third party affiliation signals.  Equity crowdfunding investors seems to pay a great deal 
of attention to the level of information asymmetry and the third party affiliations that startups 
provide. However, at this point, the equity crowdfunding industry is still in its infancy, and thus 
the data does not allow the opportunity to make meaningful evaluation of startup outcomes.  I 
hope such issues will be explored further as more data become available 
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